Tuesday, August 13, 2013
Saturday, November 28, 2009
Various casuality reports for Lee's Army at Gettysburg

Various casualty reports for Lee's Army at Gettysburg
Confederate reports for its losses at Gettysburg have always been questioned by historians. Many units underreported their losses or did not report as many losses as they obviously suffered. Determining the casualty lists for either side during the war is very difficult. But looking at Busey and Martin's book on the subject sheds some light on things. Growing up I always thought that Lee lost 28,000-30,000 men at Gettysburg but was that the case??
Lafayette Guild. Medicial Director of the Army of Northern Virginia reported 14,278 casualties in 1889.
Also in 1889 the War Department published 20,451 casualties at Gettysburg.
Details: 2592 killed, 12,709 wounded, 5,150 captured or missing
William F. Fox and his infamous study on the wars casualties reported Lee's losses at 20, 448
Details: 2592 killed, 12, 706 wounded 5,150 missing, he also noted a few thousand captured
The official reports of Lee's Corps commanders (Ewell, Longstreet, Hill and Stuart) reported 22,968 casualties.
Details: 2,701 killed, 12,739 wounded, 7,528 missing.
Historian Thomas L. Livermore calculated the Confederate casualties to be 28,063 which is the number that I most remember.
Details: 3,903 killed, 18,735 wounded and 7,528 missing, Livermore felt that the Confederate Corps commanders underreported their losses.
HIstorian Robert Krick estimated a loss of 22,915 men for Lee and his beloved army.
Details: 4,649 killed, 12,420 wounded and 5,830 missing
Busey and Martin whose book I am using for this post reported that Lee lost 23,231
Details: 4,708 killed, 12,693 wounded and 5,830 missing
Source:
Busey, John W. Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg. New York: Longstreet House, 2005.
The Numbers Game
During the three days at Gettysburg the 26th North Carolina went into the battle with 839 men. 687 of them were killed, wounded, or missing/captured. 172 were killed, an astonishing 443 were wounded & 72 were missing/captured. The regiment faced an overall loss of 81.9 percent! Granted, most Confederate casualities were unrecorded, overestimeted or underestimated but the truth is that I cannot imagine the loss of that many man. As Shelby Foote once said that whole towns saw their entire male population of military age died as a result of that brutual war. It was just madness.
Sunday, December 14, 2008
Who should I promote? Robert E. Lee after the death of Thomas J. Jackson


After Stonewall Jackson was killed the Confederate high command had an important decision ot make. The Army of Northern Virginia had entered a state of change after the beloved commander of the Second Corps met his end by a volley fired by his own troops. Lee had six eligiable candiates to replace Jackson and if you look at the list you could form a second army around these guys.
Richard Ewell-->Served with distinction with Jackson in the Valley and the Second Bull Run campaign where he was wounded.
A.P. Hill-->Lee called him his best division commander. This was very difficult for anyone to argue because Hill's division saved the Confederate right at Sharpsburg and despite a questionable performance at Fredricksburg, Hill's division possessed one of the best fighting forces in America. This was due to the strength of Hill as a commander.
John Bell Hood-->Next to Hill he was argulably Lee's best division commander. Hood had smashed the Union line at Gaines Mill and saved the Confederate left at Sharpsburg in 1862.
Richard H. Anderson-->Had one of the best resumes of any of the six commanders. He served with distinction during the Seven Days Campaign, Antietam and Second Bull Run. Anderson also was a very humble man like R.E. Lee.
Lafayette McLaws-->Another division commander and like Hood he served with skill under the commands of James Longstreet and Jackson. Like Hill he fought in every single battle that the Army of Northern Virginia had ever seen.
Jackson died on May 10, 1863 and by May 23rd the gray-bearded Lee had made his decision. He would divide his army into three corps instead of the two that had previously existed. This would make it easier for Lee and his corps commanders to dictate orders and fight battles. Longstreet would remain in command of the First Corps. As successor to Jackson, General Lee decided that Richard Ewell would become the new commander of the Second Corps.
Meanwhile the command of the newly minted Third Corps would fall to A.P. Hill. Many in the army critisized the decision and stated that the army's commander picked Hill because he was a Virginian. Years later Jefferson Davis would put this theory to rest in his memorirs by stating "There had been complaints in certain quarters that Virginia was getting more her fair share of the promotions. But the truth is that A.P. Hill was clearly entitled to the place, both ont he account of his ability as a soldier and the meritorious services he had rendered, that General Lee did not hestiate to to recommend him, and I did not hestiate to make the appointment."
Source:
Robertson, James I. General A. P. Hill : The Story of a Confederate Warrior. New York: Random House, 1987.
Saturday, August 23, 2008
Robert E. Lee Timeline or Lifeline
Robert E. Lee Timeline
1807 January 9 Robert Edward Lee is born at 'Stratford', Westmoreland County, Virginia
1829 _______ Lee graduates from the United States Military Academy at West Point.
1831 May 7 Arrives at Fortress Monroe for duty.
1831 June 30 Robert Edward Lee and Mary Anne Custis marry.
1832 September 16 George Washington Custis Lee is born.
1835 July 22 Mary Lee is born.
1837 May 30 William Henry Fitzhugh Lee is born.
1839 June 18 Annie Carter Lee is born.
1841 February 27 Elanore Agnes Lee is born.
1843 October 27 Robert Edward Lee, Jr., is born.
1846 February 10 Mildred Childe Lee is born.
1852 September 1 Lee assumes his duties as Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point.
1853 July 17 Lee is Confirmed into the Episcopal Church.
1859 October 17 Lee is ordered to the War Department in regards to John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. 1859
1859 October 18 Lee leads a command of United States Marines to capture John Brown and his cohorts at Harpers Ferry.
1860 February 9 Lee is ordered to San Antonio, Texas, to take command of the Department of Texas.
1861 April 20 Robert E. Lee resigns his commission in the United States Army.
1861 May 14 Lee is appointed Brigadier General in the Confederate States Army.
1861 June 14 Lee attains the rank of General in the Confederate States Army.
1862 May 31 Joseph E. Johnston is wounded at the Battle of Seven Pines.
1863 July 1-3 Battle of Gettysburg. MORE
1865 April 2 Lee orders the Abandonment of Petersburg, Virginia.
1865 January 23 Lee is named General in Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States.
1866 February 17 Lee appeares before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction on Capitol Hill.
1870 October 12 Robert E. Lee dies in Lexington, Virginia
1975 July 22 Congress Passed a law restoring Lee's Citizenship.
1975 August 5 President Gerald Ford signs in to law the bill Congress passed restoring Lee's Citizenship to the United States.
Sunday, January 27, 2008
"In my opinion General Robert E. Lee was average" by U.S. Grant

For many Civil War officers the war did not end with the close of hostilities. The battles moved from a war of guns to a war of words. Every veteran, whether he was a private of the President of the Confederacy penned memoirs and histories. These books usually revolved around their own personal experiences and they usually puffed up the writer at the expense of rivals.
One of these famous memoirs was written by Ulysses S. Grant. In the book, Grant provides American with its greatest military memoir. Grant offers opinions about the his chief adversary and you might be aware of him. His name is Robert E. Lee.
Grant's ideas go against the commonly held "mold" of the "Marble Man" and his supporters. These Lost Cause enthusiasts glorified the life and accomplishments of R.E. Lee and painted Grant as a butcher and one of the wars weakest generals. The former President lived during the early years of the Lost Cause and became the first "celebrity" author to challenge the greatness of General Lee. Perhaps part of Grant's opinion was molded by the attacks made by the Lost Cause supporters, Grant saw how these men were painting the history of the war and he wanted to make sure that these exaggerations would not hold up against the judgement of history.
The old Yankee general challenged the glorification of R.E. Lee and scoffed at the notion that Lee possessed superhuman abilities. Grant blamed both the northern and the southern public for giving Lee these qualities when the terrain and a bit of luck provided Lee with the opportunity for success. He used the examples of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania to support his viewpoint. The Confederate army (paraphrasing Grant) was so disrupted prior to the Wilderness that only the choking woods saved Lees army from destruction. Moreover, during the Spotsylvania Campaign Lee had several chances to exploit the vulnerability of the Union army but failed to do so. Lee remained behind his entrenchments as the Union army was separated and vulnerable to attack. Lee seemed immobilized in fog and in his memoirs Grant wrote "he seemed really to be misled as to my designs."
In fact, Grant's opinion of Lee was cited prior to the publication of his memoirs in 1885. After leaving an embattled presidency, Grant took a world tour and traveled to several countries like Egypt and France. A journalist named John Russell Young accompanied Grant and interviewed him several times during the trip. Russell wrote and article about these conversations and published them in 1878. The resulting article indicated that the general could not understand the fuss over Robert E. Lee. Grant believed that his opponent was overrated and Joseph E. Johnston was a greater threat. Lee had the backing of the Copperheads, the southern people and sympathy from the outside world. Together these things painted a rebel general who had no equal in American military history. "Everything he did was right Grant said "He was treated like a demi-god. Our generals had a hostile press, lukewarm friends and a public opinion outside."
Grant pushed further during his interview with Russell stating 'The cry was in the air that the North only won by brute force; that the generalship and valor were in the South. This has gone into history, with as many other illusions that are historical." Grant's next statement must have irked Lost Cause supporters as he stated "Lee was of a slow, conservative, cautious nature, without imagination or humor, always the same, with grave dignity. I never could see in his achievements what justifies his reputation.
Years later as he penned his memoirs, Grant went further into his opinion of Lee and supported his belief that Lee was overrated. In volume one Grant writes "The natural disposition of most people, is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know with almost superhuman abilities. A large part of the National army, for instance, and most of the press of the country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities; but I had known him personally and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that I felt this." Wow thats great stuff and it is obvious that Grant might have liked Lee personally but as a fellow professional he felt that Lee military prowess was a fabrication. Grant added further that Lee sat behind strong defensive works and never came out to give him battle in the open field. "In fact, nowhere after the battle of Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defenses far behind him."
Grants quotes bring up some intriguing questions. Did Grant feel that Lee was a wimp? Grant never questions Lee's manhood but he obviously points out that Lee as a general was not a concern for him during the Overland Campaign. Historian William Blair accuratly states that Grant's Personal Memoirs serves as Grant's own shield from the grave. I think Blair is correct in his assumption.
Friday, January 4, 2008
Robert E. Lee: The armchair general

Robert E. Lee could play the role of an armschair general. Does this comment surprise you? I hate to break it to some people but R.E. Lee was a human being and could be critical of his subordinates. Confederate General Richard S. Ewell was the subject a postwar conversations that Lee held between 1868-1870 with William Preston Johnston and William Allen. This blog isn't meant to be a personal attack on Ewell or Lee but rather a discussion of Lee's critical opinion of Richard Ewell.
Due to ill health and the management of Washington College, R.E. Lee was unable to write his memorirs. Other than Lincoln, these unwritten memoirs would have become the most important Civil War manuscript ever.
It would have been interesting to see what Lee thought of his conduct during the war, his government in Richmond and he strategy in several campaigns. It seems that Lee remained repressed is several of his writings about the war and avoided critizing his subordinates publicly.
This fits Lee's command style and his beliefs of what an armycommanders role was is well documented by Civil War historians. But what of Ewell?

In May 1863, Richard S. Ewell took over the 2nd Corps of Lee's army after Stonewall Jackson crossed over the river and rested under the shade of the trees. His conduct at the 1863 Battle of Wincheser and during the Gettysburg campaign concerned Lee. Ewell did not demonstrate the potential that he had shown as a division commander and his handling of the final moments of July 1, 1863 (prior to sundown) have been debated by historians for decades. One could argue that Ewell was timid and lacked the decisiviness needed to excel as a corps commander.

By the beginning of the 1864 spring offensive it was obvious to some that Ewell needed Lee's guiding hand in order to be successful. General Lee made the unwise decision (though its easy to be an armchair general myself) to not alter his supervisory style with Ewell. Lee had the habit of issuing discreationary, vague orders that allowed his corps commanders to make their own decisions. From these orders the corps commanders would issue their decisions to their division commanders and so on.
James Longstreet and Thomas J. Jackson worked very well under Lee because they knew what he expected and they were excellent commanders in their own right. Ewell was promoted to replace Jackson but he was unable to. Lee's opinion of Ewell (granted it is in hindsight) were pretty straightforward. He told Allan that Ewell had "faults as a miltary leader-his quick alternations from elation to despondency, his want of decision" Lee must have believed that these issues contributed to the Conferate defeat. Although they do not emancipate Lee from his own failures as a commander.
The history of Lee's failure to supervise Ewell are well documentated. As he marched north in June 1863 Lee ordered Ewell to smash Union forces at Winchester, Virginia. A victory there would open up the road north and fulfill the first part of Lee's invasion plans. Ewells orders from Lee instructed him to "be guided by his own judgement in any unforseen emergency." Ewell fullfilled his commanding officers 1868 judgement of him at Winchester with his inital confidence when he saw that he could destory the Federals. However, once Ewell inspected the enemy's works his emotials turned from "elation to despondency." He quickly sent a message to Lee asking for directions from headquarters. The Battle of Second Winchester was a Confederate victory but this was most likely due to the fighting prowess of Jackson's old corps rather than the new 2nd corps commander.
At Gettysburg Lee expressed that Ewell had fought the battle in an "imperfect, halting way" and seemed utterly disastatified with the performance of Mr. Ewell. If Lee realized that Ewell had these weaknesses in 1863 he failed to change his command style with his 2nd corps commander. In hindsight however, it is easy to say that Lee should have fulfilled his subordinate's need for close guidance and explicit orders. In closing, he should have been more forceful with Richard S. Ewell. Cambell Brown, the stepson of Ewell and his staff officer noted than General Lee's "instructions to his Corps Comrs are of a very comprehensive, general description & frequently admit of several interpretations."
Between 1868-1870 Lee expressed concern over Ewell's performance during the Battle of the Wilderness. During this contest Lee issued more unclear oders to Ewell, whose Second Corps occupied the Rebel left flank. The excellent tactictian eye of R.E. Lee saw that victory for the South was at hand if Ewell could cut the Federals off from Germanna Ford. Lee's orders asked Ewell to conduct the attack but only if it could "be done without too great a sacrifice." The ambiguous language of these orders allowed Ewell to remain on the defensive.
In his 1868 conversation with William Preston Johnston the general reminisced about the Wilderness stating that "Ewell showed vacillation" during the battle and "If Jackson had been alive and there, he would have crushed the enemy." William Allan noted that Lee told him that Ewell's movement was meant to be " full attack on flank & intended to support it with all of Ewell's corps...to rout the enemy." We've established that Lee was correct in his assumptions about Ewell but where his orders on May 6, 1864 at the Wilderness a possiblity?
First, Ewell had to attack an entrenched Federal force across rugged terrain. To make matters worse, frequent Union demonstrations had pinned down the Second Corps so that Ewell could not shift units from his right flank without exposing the Army of Northern Virginia to a disasterous counterattack. Ewell had no reserve troops to support his attack or to protect the before mentioned Confederate flank to a Federal countercharge. Ewell was overly cautious but I have to give him credit for not over committing his troops. R.E. Lee....being a human being...is correct in his assumptions about Ewell but his thoughts concerning Ewell's attack on May 6th border on fantasy.
As history records Ewell carried out the attack but his forces were too small to achieve the results that R.E. Lee needed. The limited attack captured two Union generals, captured some needed supplies and a few hundred prisoners. If "Jackson had been there" I doubt that he would have made a different decision. Perhaps Lee was thinking back to 1862 1863 when his army had the offensive firepower to carry out his brilliant attack schemes.
In the end one cannot doubt Lee's critical analysis of Ewell's career as a soldier. Perhaps, as some historians attest that the Jackson's guiding hand that had helped Ewell perform very well during Southern victories was missing. Lee failure to fill contributed to the Confederate defeats at Gettysburg and the draw at the Wilderness as much as Ewells own deficiencies as commander. If you are on Lee's side, Ewell's side, somewhere in between or indifferent you cannot deny that Lee was actually critical of a subordinate. Lee the critic is a microcosm of Civil War history that fascinates me. I will continue to look for more of his critical analysis.
91 blogs so far. Nine more means that I reach 100!!!
Friday, December 28, 2007
Army of Tennessee in McMurry's Two Great Rebel Armies book

I have previously written about the Lost Cause & a comparison between the two major Confederate armies. (The Army of Northern Virginia & The Army of Tennessee) In these blogs I discussed how the war and its literature is totally focused on the Virginia campaigns. Currently I am reading Two Great Rebel Armies by Richard M. McMurry. Written in 1989 the book compares the two armies and points out the issues that helped cause the Confederate defeat in the west. A few of McMurry's quotes stick out in my mind as I am writing this blog.
The Army of Northern Virginia held distinct advantages over the Army of Tennessee. Sure we as Civil War buffs focus on generals and how each army was treated by the Confederate government. But could the discrepancy go deeper than that? I think McMurry answers this question in Two Great Rebel Armies.
The Disadvantagous that the Army of Tennessee had in comparison to the Army of Northern Virginia:
1. Politics-->everyones favorite word. The Army of Tennessee had to deal with the sessecunist indecision of Kentucky and Missouri. Both of these states gave the Army of Tennessee valuable soldiers but the army would have recieved more men if these states seceeded. We know that they didn't secede but the lack of these states on the Confederate side severly hampered the man power of the Army of Tennesee. Morever, because Kentucky and Missouri didn't join the Confederacy the locations of the Confederate defenses were placed in areas that were not as formitable. This was done by the Confederate government because they sought to honor the neutrality of both states. This gave Northern forces a distinct advantage in the west.
2. Geography-->The Army of Northern Virginia defended an area that was roughly 160 miles long. They had the advantage of rivers that had to be forded and Lee could shift his defenses to these areas and force combat on the Army of the Potomac. Therefore, it was easy for Lee to check northern advances and we see this time and time again within the Eastern Theatre. Meanwhile, the Army of Tennessee had to defend the area between the Application Mountains in Virginia and the Ozark Mountains in Arkansas/Missouri. This area forced the rebels to defend a 600 mile wide area. When you take into account that the Army of Tennessee possessed less manpower than their Virginia counterparts it shouldn't surprise anyone that Lee was more successful than the Army of Tennessee. I also failed to mention that the rivers that the Army of Tennessee had to defended benefitted the attackers and impaired the defenders. This didn't help as the armies of Grant and Sherman beat the Confederates senseless.
3. History-->East Tennessee and Northern Alabama had strong Union ties and many of the counties in this region were anti-Confederate. Lees Virginians rarely if ever had to dal with Pro-Uniionist sentiment in the Old Dominian. The Army of Tennessee had to deal with it in Northern Alabama, East Tennessee and so forth. This hampered Confederate movements and could have had an impact on the Army of Tennessees morale.
4. Economics-->During the war the state of Virginia held the only factory capable of producing locomotives. This useless fact shows us that the other Confederate states were at a disadvantage. Nearly 40% of the southern rail lines were located in the eastern states. Also, 19.8% of southern railroads were located within Virginias borders. In the eastern Confederacy there was one mile of railroad for every 40.8 square miles of land. The west had one mile of railroad for every 146 square miles of land. Moreover, everyone knows that the rebels were vastly outnumbered in terms of soldiers and those able to fight. However, if we look closely at the southern fighting force one clearly sees that Virginia held yet another advantage over its Confederate sister states. The states of Virginia and the Carolinas (where most of the Army of Northern Virginia was drawn) held 37% of southern military age men. The eastern states, particular Virginia held a distinct advantage in manufacturing. Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina held 10,304 manufacturing establishments in 1860. The Western states held 8,252 manufacturing facilities. Roughly 33% of southern manufacturing occured in Virginia. This was yet another advantage to R.E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Furthermore, Virginia had more white inhabitants, more slaves and more men of military age than any other state in the Confederacy. These men swelled the ranks of the the Army of Northern Virginia. In the end one can conclude that the state of Virginia was more developed and thus became more important than any other southern state.
These four things do not exorniate the Confederate government or the Confederate military its western failures. However, one could not control them in 1860 and they had an impact on Southern successes and failures during the war. I guess one can conclude that the Confederate army of Tennessee started the war off with one leg already broken. Politics, geography, economics and history of the region were prexisting factors favored the Army of Northern Virginia the Army of Tennessee. With these things in mind we can easily see that the Army of Tennessee was set up for failure. One feels sorry for the men who gave their lives in a battle that they might have already lose. Too bad...oh too bad!
Saturday, October 13, 2007
The Army of Northern Virginia versus the Army of Tennessee

Army of Northern Virginia Created June 1862
Gaines Mill* 1-0
Malvern Hill* 0-1
Second Manassas 2-1
Sharpsburg 2-2
Fredricksburg 3-2
Chancellorsville 4-2
Gettysburg 4-3
The Wilderness 5-3
Spotsylvania 6-3
Cold Harbor 7-3
Petersburg 7-4
Petersburg to Appommattox** 7-5
Total Victories=7
Total Defeates=5
Total Ties=0
Winning Percentage & Record=58.3%, 7-5-0
Army of Tennessee Created Noivember 20, 1862 under the command of General Braxton Bragg
Stones River*** Tie
Chickamauga Win
Chattanooga Loss
Kennesaw Mt. Win
Peachtree Creek Loss
Battle of Atlanta Loss
Ezra Church Loss
Jonesborough Loss
Franklin Loss
Nashville Loss
Bentonville Loss
Total Victories=2
Total Defeates=8
Total Ties=1
Winning Percentage & Record= 20%, 2-8-1
*I didn't include all the Battles of the Seven Days here. I only included the two major battles of the campaign. Some argue that the Seven Days struggle was a tie but I will go with my opinion here.
**This includes the final battles of Petersburg until Lee's surrender. The Battle of Five Forks is included here.
***Some argue that the Battle of Stones River was a victory for the Confederacy. Some other historians argue that it was a tie. I will go with the latter rather than the former.
What does all this mean? What is my point here? I think that a lot of people put the Army of Northern Virginia ahead of the Army of Tennessee. The record of each army invites this as you see one army enjoying seven or more victories and the other enjoying only two victories. To put it simply the Army of Northern Virginia had just one commander as its leader from June 1862 until April 1865. This propelled Lee into becoming one of the greatest generals of all time. Meanwhile, the Army of Tennessee endured the commands of Bragg, Johnston, Hood, Taylor, Stewart and Johnston again. So from Nov. 1862 until April 26, 1865 the western army of the Confederacy had six command changes. However, despite having more defeats and lack of manpower the Army of Tennessee held out longer before surrendering at the end of April 1865. Both armies fought bravely but one had the discinction of having many more of its needs fulfilled. In many ways both armies were like two children. One child got all the latest gadgets, new clothes and was allowed to stay out later. The stepchild (Army of Tennessee) got the smaller room, the "hand-me-downs" and had to be home by curfew.
Over the years many books have been written about the army and I will include best of the best at the end of this blog. Personally, I have always had a special place in my heart for the Army of Tennessee. It was a good fighting force with men who sacrificed their blood, sweat and tears for the Confederacy. Just like the Union Army of the Ohio the Army Tennessee is rarely remembered except for its defeats at Franklin and Atlanta. I will write more about this army in a future blog. Until then goodbye.
Great books on the Army of Tennessee:
Connelly, Thomas Lawrence. Army of the Heartland; The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967.
Connelly, Thomas Lawrence. Autumn of Glory; The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971.
Daniel, Larry J. Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee: A Portrait of Life in a Confederate Army. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
Hood, John Bell. Advance and Retreat Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996.
Hughes, Nathaniel Cheairs. The Pride of the Confederate Artillery The Washington Artillery in the Army of Tennessee. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.
Horn, Stanley Fitzgerald. The Army of Tennessee. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953.
Johnston, Joseph E. Narrative of Military Operations, Directed, During the Late War between the States. New York: D. Appleton and Co, 1874.
Sherman, William T. Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman. Library of America, 51. New York: Library of America, 1990.
Watkins, Samuel R. Co. Aytch: A Side Show of the Big Show. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997.
Woodworth, Steven E. Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. Modern war studies. Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1990.
Woodworth, Steven E. Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.
A great website on the Army of Tennessee and the Union army of the Cumberland is located here:http://www.aotc.net/Bragg_home.htm#AoT
Thursday, September 20, 2007
The Battle of Antietam Anniv. Blog

Historian Stephen Sears agrees.[46]" In making his battle against great odds to
save the Republic, General McClellan had committed barely 50,000 infantry and
artillerymen to the contest. A third of his army did not fire a shot. Even at
that, his men repeatedly drove the Army of Northern Virginia to the brink of
disaster, feats of valor entirely lost on a commander thinking of little beyond
staving off his own defeat." Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red
Wednesday, September 12, 2007
Today in Civil War History

Monday, August 27, 2007
Meade and Lee reunited at Appomattox Court House

The former opposing commanders at Gettysburg ran into each other as Lee rode back to his tent. Bobby Lee asked "But what are you doing with all that grey in your beard?"
George Meade cheerfully stated "You have to answer for most of it."
This meeting represents how the war was a battle between gentlemen. So many of them knew each other, went to school with each other and served together in the United States Army. I always respected these two soldiers and it amazed me that they respected each other so much. Just looking at their brief conversation one can easily see that they respected one another. These were the men that fought each other during the wars climatic battle at Gettysburg and yet were able to joke with one another. It also shows that both men had a sense of humor despite the horrible loss that they faced from 1861-1865. Its great stuff which any Civil War buff should be aware of.
Friday, August 10, 2007
A true American finally gets his reward

I am very pleased to sign Senate Joint Resolution 23, restoring posthumously the long overdue, full rights of citizenship to General Robert E. Lee. This legislation corrects a 110-year oversight of American history. It is significant that it is signed at this place.Lee's dedication to his native State of Virginia chartered his course for the bitter Civil War years, causing him to reluctantly resign from a distinguished career in the United States Army and to serve as General of the Army of Northern Virginia. He, thus, forfeited his rights to U.S. citizenship.Once the war was over, he firmly felt the wounds of the North and South must be bound up. He sought to show by example that the citizens of the South must dedicate their efforts to rebuilding that region of the country as a strong and vital part of the American Union.In 1865, Robert E. Lee wrote to a former Confederate soldier concerning his signing the Oath of Allegiance, and I quote: "This war, being at an end, the Southern States having laid down their arms, and the questions at issue between them and the Northern States having been decided, I believe it to be the duty of everyone to unite in the restoration of the country and the reestablishment of peace and harmony."This resolution passed by the Congress responds to the formal application of General Lee to President Andrew Johnson on June 13, 1865, for the restoration of his full rights of citizenship. Although this petition was endorsed by General Grant and forwarded to the President through the Secretary of War, an Oath of Allegiance was not attached because notice of this additional requirement had not reached Lee in time.Later, after his inauguration as President of Washington College on October 2, 1865, Lee executed a notarized Oath of Allegiance. Again his application was not acted upon because the Oath of Allegiance was apparently lost. It was finally discovered in the National Archives in 1970. As a soldier, General Lee left his mark on military strategy. As a man, he stood as the symbol of valor and of duty. As an educator, he appealed to reason and learning to achieve understanding and to build a stronger nation. The course he chose after the war became a symbol to all those who had marched with him in the bitter years towards Appomattox.General Lee's character has been an example to succeeding generations, making the restoration of his citizenship an event in which every American can take pride.In approving this Joint Resolution, the Congress removed the legal obstacle to citizenship which resulted from General Lee's Civil War service. Although more than a century late, I am delighted to sign this resolution and to complete the full restoration of General Lee's citizenship.
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
Little known fact about the friendship between Lee and Longstreet

Monday, July 16, 2007
General James Longstreet and Robert E. Lee
There is a lot of Civil War research and materials regarding James Longstreet and Robert E. Lee. I have always found it interesting to read about their relationship and I am always looking for the source that really describes their friendship in detail. That source may not exist and during the war Longstreet was careful to avoid being critical of Lee's generalship. For those that don't know, Lee died in 1870 just five years after the war ended and this opened up the debate about his leadership abilities. General Jubal Early and other Confederate leaders helped make Lee into the perfect general whose only flaw was those individuals who failed him in battle. In Civil War literature it was impossible to criticize Lee or write materials that properly assesses his generalship. General James Longstreet was one of the individuals who received a lot of the blame for Lee's failure at Gettysburg. Early and others led this attack on Longstreet's generalship and for the most part avoided any attack on Robert E. Lee. Therefore, it became taboo and downright criminal for a historian or former Confederate to question Lee's decisions on the battlefield. When Longstreet began publishing materials he rated Lee behind Grant, Lincoln and even Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. This put him at odds with Early and other writers who tried to make Lee match his "marble man" nickname. But in some of Longstreets writings, he finds a way to talk about Lee in a unbiased way that brings Lee's strengths and weakness to the forefront.
While writing for The Century Magazine Longstreet produced an article which portrayed Lee as many historians view him today. Written during the height of the Early & Longstreet quarrels, this quote is important because Longstreet avoids criticism of Lee in response to an Early attack. Moreover, the quote by Longstreet paints a portrait of Lee's generalship and abilities that is accurate by todays standards. Here is the quote:
"General Lee was an unusually handsome man, even in his advanced life. He seemed fresh from West Point, so trim was his figure and so elastic his step. Out of battle he was as gently as a woman, but when the clash of arms came he loved fight, and urged his battle with wonderful determination. As a usual thing he was remarkably well-balanced---always so, except on one or two occasions of severe trial when he failed to maintain his exact equipoise. Lee's orders were always well considered and well chosen. He depended almost too much on his officers for their execution.....Without a doubt the greatest man of rebellion times, the one matchless among forty millions for the peculiar difficulties of the period was Abraham Lincoln."
Even for the casual reader it is obvious that such a quote put Longstreet at odds with or didn't help any cause against Lee's supporters. This is not a criticism of James Longstreet but for a former Confederate to say that Abraham Lincoln was the true genus of the war gave Longstreet's detractors more ammunition to use against him. I doubt that Longstreet felt so strongly about Lincoln during the war and his opinion of "Honest Abe" needs to be taken in the context of Longstreets Republican identification which sought to lionize Lincoln in the same manner that Confederates tried to immortalize Lee. However, I truly agree with Longstreet about Lincoln and I want it to be known that I agree with "Old Pete's" assessment of Lee as a man. His statement about Lee staying under control except for the occasions where "he failed to maintain his exact equipoise" brings images of Gettysburg to mind. I wonder if Longstreet was talking about July 1-3 1863 when General Lee pushed his army too far. General Longstreet felt that Lee was a good man but he pointed out that Lee did make mistakes. In Longstreet's eyes, Lee was not an immortal god, above reproach and free of error but rather a man who had flaws. Perhaps what Longstreet saw and what Early didn't see is that Lee was a true American hero, who did great things but had his own demons and suffered setbacks. After all, what makes a hero is the ability to bounce back, to stand the test of time and to see things to the end despite the possibility of failure. Such a person was Robert E. Lee.
Sunday, July 15, 2007
Interesting quote about Robert E. Lee

Lee receives, and rightfully so, a lot of the blame for the failure of the Confederacy at Gettysburg. Most of this blame is due to his combative nature as a commander and his impulsive attitude in battle. Polley writes:
"The truth is, that while he was a great general, a profound and wily strategist, a consummate master of the art of war, Robert E. Lee the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, was in temperament a game cock. The mere presence of an enemy aroused his pugnacity, and was a challenge he found it hard to decline, and at Gettysburg, impossible....the pugnacity inherited from a long line of fighting ancestors thrilled the nerves of the Confederate commander and dominated an ordinarily cool judgement; the enemy invited and challenged a contest, and a contest he should have."
Polley even researched General Lees own report on Gettysburg to back up this statement. In his official report Lee wrote "It had not been intended to deliver a great battle so far from our base unless attacked. But coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with out extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous." In a nutshell Lee's report tells me two things. First, he wasn't ready for a general engagement. This should not shock experts on the Battle of Gettysburg because Lee's three corps were spread throughout the countryside. Secondly, Lee might have been making an excuse for bringing on an engagement because he saw a chance for winning the war. Lee once wrote General Hood that he felt his men were "invincible" and since they had defeated or fought to a draw the Union Army of the Potamac in every battle since he took command then Lee's conclusion seems plausible. July 1st didn't help matters as the Army of Northern Virginia pushed back the Federal army to the ridges and hills beyond Gettysburg. If you research the battle you will no doubt come to the conclusion that Lee felt that one more push, one decisive blow would win a victory on Northern soil and put the Union in a perilous position. Lee was an aggressive commander and as author Shelby Foote once said "Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having R.E. Lee." Gettysburg cost Lee's army 1/3 of its fighting force and that was a heavy blow to the Southern cause. Lee gambled as he had on so many battlefields and every gambler must lose eventually. At sake was Southern independence and the Lee's gamble failed.
This infomation was taken from J. B. Polley, Hood's Texas Brigade, Dayton, OH: Morningside Bookshop, 1976.
Saturday, July 14, 2007
Law's Alabama Brigade book review: My first book review

Friday, July 13, 2007
Evander M. Law


